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Abstract. This work deals with the implementation of social choice rules using dominant strategies for
unrestricted preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that only few unappealing
social choice rules can be implemented unless we assume some restrictions on the preferences or allow
monetary transfers. When monetary transfers are allowed and quasi-linear utilities w.r.t. money are
assumed, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms were shown to implement any affine-maximizer,
and by the work of Roberts, only affine-maximizers can be implemented whenever the type sets of the
agents are rich enough.
In this work, we generalize these results and define a new class of preferences: Preferences which are
positive-represented by a quasi-linear utility. That is, agents whose preference on a subspace of the
outcomes, which is defined by a threshold, can be modeled using a quasi-linear utility. We show that
the characterization of VCG mechanisms as the incentive-compatible mechanisms extends naturally to
this domain. We show that the original characterization of VCG mechanism is an immediate corollary
of our generalized characterization. Our result follows from a simple reduction to the characterization
of VCG mechanisms. Hence, we see our result more as a fuller more correct version of the VCG
characterization than a new non-quasi-linear domain extension.
This work also highlights a common misconception in the community attributing the VCG result to
the usage of transferable utility. Our result shows that these results extend naturally to the non-
transferable utility domain. That is, that the incentive-compatibility of the VCG mechanisms does not
rely on money being a common denominator, but rather on the ability of the designer to fine the agents
on a continuous (maybe agent-specific) scale.
We also provide simple characterizations of the types which are represented and pos-represented by
quasi-linear utility functions. We show characterizations both in utility function terms and in preference
terms, by that supplying a full comparison of the different classes.
We think these two insights, considering the utility as a representation and not as the preference itself
(which is common in the economic community) and considering utilities which represent the preference
only for the relevant domain, would turn out to fruitful in other domains as well.
Keywords: Mechanism Design Strategy-proofness Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility Non
Quasi-linear Utilities Positive-representation Roberts’ Theorem
1 Introduction
Consider the problem of a designer who wishes to implement a given social choice rule. That is, consider a
finite set of agentsN and a finite set of possible social alternativesA s.t. each agent holds a preference (a total
order) over A; The designer needs to choose, as a function of the agents’ preferences, one social alternative
out of A, e.g., one that maximizes a social welfare or some other criterion, but the preferences are a-priori
unknown to the designer. A na¨ıve procedure for the designer would be to first query the preferences of the
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agents and choose the alternative accordingly. The problem with such solution is that an agent might report
her preference untruthfully if she thinks it might result in a better alternative for her, by that preventing
the designer from choosing correctly.
In this work, we study the fundamental question of which social choice rules are implementable by a
principal, using the most basic implementation concept of dominant-strategies. That is, we aim to character-
ize which social choice rules can be implemented s.t. no agent has an incentive to misreport her preference,
independent of the reports of the other agents, and to show a mechanism for any such implementable social
choice rule. Furthermore, we analyze implementation using deterministic incentive-compatible direct reve-
lation mechanisms. In a direct revelation mechanism each agent is asked to report her true preference and
subsequently a decision is made according to a decision rule. Incentive-compatibility for these mechanism
means that an agent cannot benefit from reporting a preference different from her true preference. In the
sequel, we assume the mechanisms are direct and deterministic and in Section 4 we discuss these restrictions
and how to relax them. In particular, note that the assumption of the mechanism being direct is without loss
of the generality, as according to the revelation principle [11] any implementable social choice rule is imple-
mentable using a direct revelation mechanism and the characterization of direct revelation implementations
is easily lifted to the general characterization.
The seminal works of Gibbard [3] and Satterthwaite [14] show that without further assumptions, if all
profiles of preferences are feasible, one cannot devise a mechanism for choosing a single alternative, besides
trivial procedures which a-priori ignore most agents or most alternatives. Assuming the preferences of the
agents are richer and include intensity of preferences (that is, a cardinal utility function u : A → ℜ which
assigns for every alternative its utility or desirability for the agent) does not circumvent this impossibility.
On the other hand, the seminal works of Vickrey [15], Clarke [2], and Groves [5] show that allowing the
designer to induce monetary transfers (pay money to the agents or charge them) gives rise to a non-trivial
family of implementable social choice rules, while still assuming that all profile preferences are feasible. That
is, the outcome is both a chosen alternative and in addition a sequence of payments of the agents (which
might be negative, i.e., payment to the agents). In addition, the preferences of the agents is extended to
preferences over A×ℜ, the tuples of an alternative and a payment of the agent. Note that (under some mild
conditions) such preference also defines a monetary value for each alternative and hence defines a cardinal
utility v : A → ℜ over the alternatives.
When all agents’ preferences are defined by quasi-linear utility functions u : A × ℜ → ℜ of the form
u (a, z) = v (a) − z for some v : A → ℜ, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are incentive-
compatible direct mechanisms which can implement any affine-maximizer of the agents’ valuation func-
tions v [15, 2, 5]. Moreover, Green and Laffont [4] and Roberts [13] later showed that these are the only
incentive-compatible onto mechanisms when all profiles of quasi-linear utility functions are feasible.
However, quasi-linearity is a strong assumption. On the individual level, it is an assumption that in
particular there is no income effect in the evaluations of the alternatives, which might be violated due to,
for example, lack of liquidity, wealth effect, or risk-aversion. On the society level, it is an assumption of a
transferable utility model, that is, an assumption that the ‘utility loss’ due to paying $1 for Agent i equals
to the ‘utility gain’ due to receiving this amount for Agent j.
Hence, it is of interest to search of other preference domains for which non-trivial implementable social
choice rules exist, while still inducing the full unrestricted set of preferences over the alternatives. To the
best of our knowledge, except the aforementioned works for quasi-linear utilities, very few papers considered
social choice mechanisms with monetary transfers without restricting the possible profiles of preferences over
the alternatives (In much more restricted domains, like single-peaked facility location [9] or auctions, just to
name two, there are many truthful mechanisms that are not affine-maximizers.).
The work most relevant to this paper is the result by Ma et al. [7]. In this work, Ma et al. present a new
family of utility functions, the parallel utility functions, which is a super-set of the family of the quasi-linear
utility functions. Following the works of Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves and the work of Roberts, they present
a family of mechanisms which are incentive-compatible whenever all agents have parallel utility functions,
and prove that the induced social choice rules are the only implementable rules (under two additional mild
conditions, No subsidy & Individual rationality) if all induced valuation profiles are feasible.
2
Our Results
We think that parallel utility functions can be seen as a special case of disguised almost quasi-linear utility
functions, by that strengthening the knife-edginess of the quasi-linear scenario and the characterization of
VCG mechanisms. We formalize this by two insights (which catches this intuitive notion of ‘disguised almost
quasi-linear’). We discuss this connection we see in more details in Section 4.
First, we notice that VCG mechanisms do not depend on the quasi-linear representation an agent reports
and can be stated (while still maintaining the characterization result) as mechanisms that get as input
the preferences of the agents and not utility functions. In particular, VCG mechanisms can be extended to
receive non-quasi-linear utility functions as long as there is some quasi-linear representation of it (quasi-
linear in disguise). While this observation is technically trivial, we think it is conceptually important as
being consistent with the revealed preferences principle and in particular with the fact that one cannot test
whether an agent holds one utility representationor the other, so in general there is no base to assume that
one utility function better represents the agent.
Second, our main insight is a weaker notion of representation, positive-representation (and shortly pos-
representation). We say an agent’s preference is pos-represented by a utility function if they coincide whenever
the utility of at least one of the two comparands is positive (and not for any two comparands as with regular
representation by a utility function). This new simple notion allows us to extend the previous above works
of Vickrey, Clarke, Groves, Green-Laffont, Roberts.
We extend the VCG mechanisms to mechanisms that get as input preferences which are pos-represented
by quasi-linear functions. We show that these mechanisms are incentive compatible (Theorem 1) and show
that when all induced valuation profiles are feasible, essentially these are the only incentive-compatible onto
mechanisms (Theorem 2). This result extends the characterizations of Roberts [13] and Green-Laffont [4].
We argue that preferences which are pos-represented by quasi-linear utility functions maintain the es-
sential properties of quasi-linear utility functions (hence we call them ‘disguised almost quasi-linear utility
functions’) and we see the simple proofs by reduction as a supporting evidence for that. This strengthens
the knife-edginess of the VCG phenomenon by showing that the quasi-linear domain is essentially the only
unrestricted preference domain for which an incentive-compatible non-trivial implementation is known, and
we hope this gives a better research direction of exploring mechanism design beyond quasi-linear preferences.
Furthermore, we think that our work addresses a common misconception in the community of the reason
why introducing money enables the design of general mechanisms and circumventing impossibility results a`
la Gibbard-Satterthwaite. Many works attribute the VCG result to the extended model being a transferable
utility model. For example, in the Algorithmic Game Theory book [12], we found that VCG Mechanisms
(and the driving force behind their incentive compatibility) are introduced using phrases like “Money can
be transferred between players. ... (This) will allow us to do things that we could not do otherwise.” Our
work shows that the main driving-force is the individual additive-separability and that the introduction of
transferable utility does not play a role in the characterization. For instance, the principal might use different
incomparable payment methods for different agents. We discuss the connection to the stronger assumption
of quasi-linearity and transferable utility in more details in Section 4.
Identifying the preference of an agent with her cardinal utility is basic in the theory of modeling eco-
nomic agents, and in most scenarios, unless additional strong assumptions are added, the utility is only a
representation of the preference and does not hold any additional information of the decision behavior of
the agent. Moreover, in many cases, one’s assumptions on the agents’ preferences are mostly irrelevant when
considering outcomes below some threshold or an outside option. Hence, we think these two insights could
be fruitful in other domains as well.
To ease the reading flow, some of the less significant proofs are postponed to the appendix.
2 Model
We denote the set of agents by N , the set of alternatives by A, and their respective size by n = |N | and
m = |A|. Each agent holds a preference, i.e. an order, over A × ℜ, the set of tuples of an alternative and
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a payment of the agent. We also refer to the preference as the agent’s type. We say a cardinal function
u : A×ℜ → ℜ represents [8, Def. 1.B.2] a preference < (and refer to u as the utility function) if for any two
alternatives a, b ∈ A and two payments za, zb ∈ ℜ,
〈a, za〉 < 〈b, zb〉 ⇐⇒ u (a, za) > u (b, zb) .
It is not hard to see that two utility functions u,w : A× ℜ → ℜ represent the same preference iff one is
a monotone transformation of the other, that is, there exists a monotone bijection ϕ : ℜ → ℜ s.t. u = ϕ ◦w.
In this work, we assume that the preferences of the agents can be represented by a utility function u s.t.
u is strictly decreasing in the payment, i.e., an agent prefers to pay less. We denote the set of all utility
functions which are strictly decreasing in the payment by U and the set of preferences (types) represented
by utility functions from U by T . We use the notations of types and type sets in our results to emphasize
that our results are invariant to the choice of representations. In places it is not important, in order to ease
the readability, we sometimes use utility functions to characterize directly the agents.
A special family of utility functions are the quasi-linear utility functions.1 These are the utility functions
of the form u (a, z) = v (a) − z for some function v : A → ℜ which is referred to as the valuation. We
denote the set of all quasi-linear utility functions by UQL. We note that the quasi-linear representations of a
preference are closed to shifts by a constant and in particular a preference can be represented by a continuum
of quasi-linear utility functions.
Claim 1. Let u,w : A × ℜ → ℜ be two quasi-linear utility functions. Then the following three statements
are equivalent:
1. Both u and w represent the same preference over A×ℜ.
2. There exists a constant C ∈ ℜ s.t. for any alternative a ∈ A u (a, 0) = w (a, 0) + C.
3. There exists a constant C ∈ ℜ s.t. for any alternative a ∈ A and z ∈ ℜ u (a, z) = w (a, z) + C.
In a recent work, Ma el al. defined a new class of utility function extending the quasi-linear family, which
they named Parallel utility functions.
Definition 1 (Parallel utility functions [7]).
A utility function u : A × ℜ → ℜ is a parallel utility function if • u (a, z) is continuous and strictly
decreasing in z, • For any alternative a ∈ A, limz→∞ u (a, z) < mina′∈A u (a′, 0), i.e., an agent prefers her
worst alternative for free over paying a large enough payment for a, and • For any two alternatives a, b ∈ A
s.t. u (a, 0) > u (b, 0) and any payment z > 0 s.t. u (b, z) > mina′∈A u (a
′, 0) (i.e., any positive payment z
s.t. the agent prefers paying z for b over receiving some alternative for free)
u
(
a, z +
(
pa − pb
))
= u (b, z) ,
for pa being the payment z s.t. u (a, z) = mina′∈A u (a
′, 0), i.e., pa is the maximal payment s.t. the agent
prefers paying it for a over receiving for free her worst alternative, and pb is defined similarly.
Example i. Let u ∈ UQL be a quasi linear utility function, i.e., u (a, z) = v (a) − z for some valuation
function v : A → ℜ. Then, for any two alternatives a, b ∈ A, pa = v (a)−mina′∈A v (a
′) and
u
(
a, z +
(
pa − pb
))
= v (a)− [z + (v (a)− v (b))] = v (b)− z = u (b, z) ,
i.e., u is a parallel utility function.
Example ii. Generalizing the former, let u ∈ UQL be a quasi-linear utility function and consider a utility
function u′ ∈ U which coincides with u whenever u (a, z) > mina′∈A u (a′, 0) (but still u′ is continuous and
downward monotone in the payment). For any two alternatives a, b ∈ A s.t. u′ (a, 0) > u′ (b, 0) and any
payment z > 0 s.t. u′ (b, z) > mina′∈A u
′ (a′, 0), it holds that • u (a, 0) = u′ (a, 0) > u′ (b, 0) = u (b, 0), •
pa = u (a, 0)−mina′∈A u (a′, 0) and similarly for b. So pa > pb, and hence
u′ (b, z) = u (b, z) = u
(
a, z +
(
pa − pb
))
= u′
(
a, z +
(
pa − pb
))
,
i.e., u is a parallel utility function.
1 In the economics literature (e.g., [4]) these functions are also referred to as separable or additively separable.
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Example iii. On the other hand, consider the following utility function.
u (a, z) =
{
z 6 −3 −3− z
z > −3 −1− z/3
; u (b, z) = −2− z ; u (c, z) =
{
z 6 −1 −1− z
z > −1 −3− 3z.
Then, u coincides with the quasi-linear utility function

uQL (a, z) = −3− z
uQL (b, z) = −2− z
uQL (c, z) = −1− z
whenever uQL (x, z) > 0 =
3 + mina′∈A u
QL (a′, 0) but it is not a parallel utility function. One could see that by noticing that pa = 6,
pb = 1, and pc = 0, but for z = 0:
u
(
a, z +
(
pa − pb
))
= u (a, 5) = −8/3
u (b, z) = u (b, 0) = −2.
Given type domains T1, . . . , Tn ⊆ T for the agents, a direct mechanism with monetary transfers (or
shortly a mechanism) for ×i∈NTi is defined by two functions x : ×i∈N Ti → A and p : ×i∈N Ti → ℜN (and
we notate by pi the i
th coordinate of p) in the following way: At the first stage each agent reports her type,
and based on the reports t1, . . . , tn, the alternative x (t1, . . . , tn) is chosen and Agent i pays pi (t1, . . . , tn).
We say that a mechanism 〈x, p〉 is onto if the function x is onto, i.e., any alternative is the outcome of some
report vector.2 We use the notation T−i for ×j 6=iTj , and say that a mechanism 〈x, p〉 is incentive compatible
if it is in an agent best interest to always report truthfully her type. Formally, for any type ti ∈ Ti and any
sequence of reports t−i ∈ T−i,
ti ∈ argmax
t′
i
∈Ti
〈x (t′i, t−i) , pi (t
′
i, t−i)〉 ,
where the maximum is taken according to the preference ti.
An interesting class of incentive-compatible mechanisms are the affine VCG mechanisms which get as
reports utility functions and not general preferences.
Definition 2 (Affine VCG mechanism).
We say that a mechanism 〈x, p〉 is an affine VCG mechanism if there exist an agent weight vector
w ∈ ∆ (N ) (i.e., w ∈ [0, 1]N and
∑
i∈N wi = 1), an alternative cost vector c ∈ ℜ
A, and a non-empty set of
alternatives A′ ⊆ A s.t. for any report vector (u1, . . . , un) ∈ ×i∈NUi,
x (u1, . . . , un) ∈ argmax
a∈A′
(
ca +
∑
i∈N
wi · ui (a, 0)
)
and there exist functions hi : U−i → ℜ for i = 1, . . . , n s.t. for any report vector (u1, . . . , un) the payment of
Agent i is
pi (ui, u−i) = hi (u−i)− 1/wi ·
∑
j 6=i
wj · uj (a
⋆, 0) + ca⋆
 for a⋆ = x (ui, u−i)
if wi > 0 and pi (ui, u−i) = hi (u−i) if wi = 0 (i.e., if Agent i has no influence of the chosen alternative
x (ui, u−i)).
In their works, Vickrey [15], Clarke [2], and Groves [5] proved that when for all agents Ui ⊆ UQL, i.e.,
all agents hold quasi-linear utility functions, these mechanisms are incentive-compatible. In particular, an
agent is indifferent between reporting different representations of her type. Furthermore, recalling that two
(quasi-linear) utility functions represent the same preference iff they differ by a constant, we note that x
and pi are actually invariant to the representation an Agent i reports. Later, Green and Laffont [4] and
Roberts [13] proved that if for all agents Ui = UQL, these are the only direct onto incentive-compatible
mechanisms.
2 In the social choice and economics literature [1, 10], this property is also referred to as Citizen sovereignty and as
Non-imposition.
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Theorem (Roberts [13, Thm. 3.1] & Green and Laffont [4, Thm. 3]).
Let 〈x, p〉 be an onto incentive-compatible mechanism for the case
[
∀i Ui = UQL
]
. Then, it is an affine
VCG mechanism.
3 Main Result
In this work, we introduce a weaker notion of representation we call positive-representation.
Definition 3 (Positive-representation).
We say a utility function u : A×ℜ → ℜ pos-represents a preference < if for any two alternatives a, b ∈ A
and payments za, zb ∈ ℜ s.t. either u (a, za) > 0 or u (b, zb) > 0,
〈a, za〉 < 〈b, zb〉 ⇐⇒ u (a, za) > u (b, zb) .
That is, we require u to represent the preference only above some threshold (The choice of zero as the
threshold is for normalization). E.g., in Example iii we saw a preference which coincides with a quasi-linear
utility function uQL whenever the utility is positive (but the threshold was not mina∈A u
QL (a, 0) and the
utility was not a parallel utility). One could think of this threshold as representing an outside option so we
are not interested in modeling the agent’s preferences between two unacceptable alternatives. This allows
one to represent the agent using a simpler utility function (quasi-linear in our case). For example, a common
practice is to model a buyer in a combinatorial auction using a valuation function v : 2X → ℜ which assigns
a monetary value to each subset of items, and a quasi-linear utility function u (S, z) = v (S)− z for S ⊆ X
and z ∈ ℜ. In particular, such representation entails a preference between two outcomes in which the buyer
over-paid for the bundle she received. But in most cases, it is assumed a buyer can always refuse to over-pay,
and it might be a better modeling to assume indifference. Moreover, commonly this preference pays no role
in the analysis, so the analysis should be applicable also if the buyer has a different preference between such
outcomes.
In this work we are interested in agents that can be pos-represented by quasi-linear utility functions, and
show that the characterization of incentive-compatible mechanisms is naturally extended for these prefer-
ences.
It is straight-forward from the definition that if a utility function u represents a preference then in
particular u pos-represents the preference. Moreover, as a corollary of Claim 1 we get the following.
Corollary 1. Let u ∈ UQL be a quasi-linear utility function and < a preference s.t. u represents <. Then,
for any constant C ∈ ℜ the utility function u+ C pos-represents <.
Note that only a weaker version of Claim 1 holds for pos-representations. One can find two quasi-linear
utility functions u, v ∈ UQL which differ by a constant but u pos-represents a preference which v does
not. For instance, take A = {a, b, c} and the preference which is defined by the following utility function
w : A×ℜ → ℜ:
w (a, z) = 1− z ; w (b, z) =
{
z 6 2 2− z
z > 2 4− 2z
; w (c, z) =
{
z 6 3 3− z
z > 3 9− 3z.
z
0 1 2 3
w (a, z)
w (b, z)
w (c, z)
Then, this preference is pos-represented by the quasi-linear utility function

u (a, z) = 1− z
u (b, z) = 2− z
u (c, z) = 3− z
but not by
u′ (a, z) = 7− z
u′ (b, z) = 8− z
u′ (c, z) = 9− z
. For instance

u′ (a, 6) = 1
u′ (b, 6) = 2
u′ (c, 6) = 3
but

w (a, 6) = −5
w (b, 6) = −8
w (c, 6) = −9
.
Claim 2. Let u,w : A×ℜ → ℜ be two quasi-linear utility functions.
1. If both u and w pos-represent the same preference, then there exists a constant C ∈ ℜ s.t.
∀a ∈ A, z ∈ ℜ w (a, z) = u (a, z) + C.
2. If there exists a positive constant C > 0 s.t.
∀a ∈ A, z ∈ ℜ w (a, z) = u (a, z)− C,
then w pos-represents any preference which is pos-represented by u.
The mechanism
Given a non-empty set of alternatives A′ ⊆ A, an agent weight vector w ∈ ∆ (N ), and an alternative cost
vector c ∈ ℜA, we define the following mechanism for the scenario that for all i ∈ N , any type of Agent i,
t ∈ Ti, is pos-represented by (at least one) quasi-linear utility function u ∈ UQL.
Mechanism 1. Given a vector of reports (t1, . . . , tn) for ti ∈ Ti,
◮ Define ui to be an arbitrary quasi-linear utility function which pos-represents ti.
◮ Choose a⋆ ∈ argmaxa∈A′
(
ca +
∑
i∈N wi · ui (a, 0)
)
and return
• The chosen alternative: x (t1, . . . , tn) = a⋆.
• The payment of Agent i: If wi > 0,
pi (t1, . . . , tn) = hi (t−i)− 1/wi ·
ca⋆ +∑
j 6=i
wj · uj (a
⋆, 0)
 ,
for some function hi which depends only on the reports of the other agents, and in case wi = 0,
pi (t1, . . . , tn) = hi (t−i).
There is no constraint on the choice of the pos-representations ui in the first step of the mechanism. Nev-
ertheless, we note that, similarly to our note for the VCG mechanism, the choice of pos-representation
for Agent i does not influence the chosen alternative x or her payment pi. Based on Claim 2, the set
argmaxa∈A′
(
ca +
∑
i∈N wi · ui (a, 0)
)
does not depend on the chosen pos-representations, and the payment of
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Agent i is influenced only by the choice of pos-representations for other agents. Hence, one can derive a mech-
anism with a more natural input language which gets (a compact representation of) some pos-representation
of the agent’s preference. We show that Mechanism 1 is incentive-compatible under an additional bound on
the payment functions hi.
Theorem 1.
Let ∅ 6= A′ ⊆ A, w ∈ ∆ (N ) be an agent weight vector, c ∈ ℜA an alternative cost vector, and 〈x, p〉
Mechanism 1 defined by 〈A′, w, c〉. Then 〈x, p〉 is an incentive-compatible mechanism whenever the following
hold:
– For all i ∈ N , any type of Agent i is pos-represented by a quasi-linear utility function u ∈ UQL.
– For all i ∈ N , the function h−i in the definition of Mechanism 1 satisfies that for any profile of types
t1 ∈ T1, . . . , tn ∈ Tn, there exist quasi-linear utility functions u1, . . . , un ∈ U
QL s.t. ui pos-represents ti
and
hi (t−i) 6 1/wi ·max
a∈A′
ca +∑
j
wj · uj (a, 0)
 .
Before proving the theorem, it is worthwhile to understand the bound on hi for the following two scenarios:
If all types of all agents are represented by some quasi-linear utility function, then for any function hi we can
find pos-representations of the types s.t. the bound will hold (since for any constant C > 0 (u+ C) represents,
and hence also pos-represents, the same preference as u). If all types of all agents are pos-represented by some
quasi-linear utility function ui ∈ UQL which satisfies mina∈A′ ui (a, 0) > 0, then the Clarke pivot rule [12,
Def. 9.19]
hi (t−i) = 1/wi ·max
a∈A′
ca +∑
j 6=i
wj · uj (a, 0)

satisfies this bound. Last, we note that such function might not exist when the type sets are too rich. E.g.,
when ca ≡ 0, wi ≡ 1, and Ti = {uα}α∈ℜ for v (x) =

x = a 1
x = b 2
x = c 3
and uα (x, z) =
{
z 6 v (x)− α v (x)− α− z
O/W (v (x)− α− z)3 ,
uα (for large enough α) is pos-represented only by quasi-linear utility functions satisfying u
QL (x, 0) 6 −α
for all alternatives x ∈ A, so the bound is not feasible,
Proof of Theorem 1.3
We will show that Agent i maximizes her preference by reporting truthfully. First, we notice that if
wi = 0 this claim is trivial since the agent has no influence on the chosen alternative or on her payment.
Henceforth, we assume that wi > 0.
Let ti ∈ Ti be the preference of Agent i, and let t−i ∈ ×j 6=iTj be the reports of the other agents. Next,
for j = 1, . . . , n, let uj be the quasi-linear pos-representation of tj which was chosen by the mechanism.
First, we show that Agent i maximizes the utility ui by reporting truthfully. If an alternative a is chosen,
the utility is
ui (a, 0)− hi (t−i) + 1/wi ·
ca +∑
j 6=i
wj · uj (a, 0)
 ,
and this expression is maximized when
ca +
∑
j
wj · uj (a, 0)
is maximized which is what happens when Agent i reports truthfully.
3 Our proof follows the steps of the incentive-compatibility proof of the VCG mechanism of Nisan [12, Prop. 9.31]
with few modifications.
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Based on Claim 2, the set of maximizers, argmaxa∈A′
(
ca +
∑
j∈N wj · uj (a, 0)
)
, is invariant to the
choice of pos-representations of the agents’ preferences. By the assumption on h−i, there exist pos-representations
u1, . . . , un ∈ UQL of the agents preferences s.t.
ui (x (t1, . . . , tn) , pi (t1, . . . , tn)) = 1/wi ·
cx(t1,...,tn) +∑
j
wj · uj (a
⋆, 0)
− hi (t−i) > 0,
so maximizing ui also maximizes the preference of Agent i. ⊓⊔
Next, we show that when the type sets Ti are rich enough, there is no other onto incentive-compatible
mechanisms.
Theorem 2.
If there are at least three alternatives (|A| > 3) and for any i ∈ N there exist a bijection ϕi between
Ti and
{
u ∈ UQL
∣∣ mina∈A u (a, 0) = 0} s.t. for any type t ∈ Ti, t is pos-represented by ϕi (t), then any
incentive-compatible onto mechanism 〈x, p〉 s.t. for any profile of types t1 ∈ T1, . . . , tn ∈ Tn, the payment of
the ith agent satisfies
pi (t1, . . . , Tn) 6 [ϕi (t)] (x (t1, . . . , tn) , 0) ,
can be defined as Mechanism 1 w.r.t. A′ = A, an agent weight vector w ∈ ∆ (N ), and an alternative cost
vector c ∈ ℜA.
Following the steps of Roberts [13, Thm. 3.2], we get as a corollary that without monetary transfers the only
incentive-compatible mechanisms are dictatorships.
Corollary 2.
If there are at least three alternatives and the type sets {Ti}i∈N satisfy the conditions of Thm. 2, then
for any incentive-compatible onto mechanism 〈x, p〉 without transfers (i.e., pi (t1, . . . , tn) ≡ 0 for all i ∈ N ),
there exists a unique agent d ∈ N (a dictator) s.t. for any type profile (t1, . . . , tn)
x (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ argmax
a∈A
ud (a, 0) .
Proof of Theorem 2.
Let 〈x, p〉 be an incentive-compatible onto mechanism as stated in the theorem. We define the following
auxiliary mechanism for the case in which the type sets of all agents are UQL, i.e., all quasi-linear utility
functions. (Since ϕi is a bijection we use the notation ϕi for ϕi
−1 as well)
Mechanism. Given a vector of reports (u1, . . . , un) ∈
(
UQL
)N
,
◮ For i = 1, . . . , n
• Define u˜i ∈ UQL by u˜i (a, 0) = ui (a, 0)−mina′∈A ui (a′, 0).
• Define ti ∈ Ti to be ϕi (u˜) ∈ Ti.
◮ Apply the mechanism 〈x, p〉 on the type vector (t1, . . . , tn) and return the same.
Then the following two properties hold:
– The mechanism is onto. Let a ∈ A. Since 〈x, p〉 is an onto mechanism, there exists a type profile
(t1 ∈ T1, . . . , tn ∈ Tn) which is mapped by the mechanism 〈x, p〉 to the alternative a. For i = 1, . . . , n, let
ui be a quasi-linear utility function s.t. ϕi (ui) = ti. For this profile, in the first step of the mechanism
ui = u˜i and it is mapped to ti and hence the chosen alternative is a.
– The mechanism is incentive compatible. We will show that Agent i maximizes her utility by reporting
truthfully. Let ui ∈ UQL be the utility of Agent i, u−i ∈ ×j 6=iUQL be the reports of the other agents,
and 〈a, z〉 be the outcome of the mechanism when Agent i reports truthfully, i.e., for the profile (ui, u−i).
Next, consider a report for Agent i, ûi, and let 〈â, ẑ〉 be the outcome for the profile (ûi, u−i). We define
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tj ∈ Tj for j = 1, . . . , n and t̂i ∈ Ti to be the corresponding types in the first step of the mechanism, and
note that {
a = x (ti, t−i)
zi = pi (ti, t−i)
&
{
â = x
(
t̂i, t−i
)
ẑi = pi
(
t̂i, t−i
)
.
〈x, p〉 is an incentive-compatible mechanism and hence 〈a, zi〉 is weakly preferred over 〈â, ẑi〉 according
to the type ti. Let u˜i be the utility which ui is mapped to in the first step of the mechanism. Since u˜i
pos-represents ti = ϕi (u˜i) and our assumption on the payments, we get that u˜i (a, zi) > u˜i (â, ẑi) and
hence
ui (a, zi) = u˜i (a, zi) + min
a′∈A
ui (a
′, 0) > u˜i (â, ẑi) + min
a′∈A
ui (a
′, 0) = ui (â, ẑi) .
Hence, by the theorems of Roberts [13, Thm. 3.1] and Green-Laffont [4], there exist an agent weight vector
w ∈ ∆ (N ) and an alternative cost vector c ∈ ℜA s.t. for any report vector (u1, . . . , un) ∈
(
UQL
)N
the
alternative returned by the mechanism a⋆ satisfies
a⋆ ∈ argmax
a∈A
(
ca +
∑
i∈N
wi · ui (a, 0)
)
,
and for i = 1, . . . , n, the payment of Agent i equals to
pi (ui, u−i) = hi (u−i)− 1/wi ·
∑
j 6=i
wj · uj (a
⋆, 0) + ca⋆

if wi > 0 and to hi (u−i) otherwise, for some function hi : U−i → ℜ.
By Claim 2, if two quasi-linear utility functions u,w ∈ UQL pos-represent a preference ti ∈ Ti, then u and
w differ by a constant. Since the set of maximizers, argmaxa∈A
(
ca +
∑
i∈N wi · ui (a, 0)
)
, is invariant to such
constant shifts, a⋆ ∈ argmaxa∈A
(
ca +
∑
i∈N wi · ui (a, 0)
)
for any choice of quasi-linear pos-representations
of the agents’ types. Hence, we get the required characterization of the allocation rule x.
Next, notice that for u,w ∈ UQL as above, u and w are mapped to the same type at the first stage of
the mechanism, so also hi does not depend on the pos-representations. I.e., it can be defined as a function
of the types hi : T−i → ℜ, which gives us the required characterization of the payment rule p. ⊓⊔
Types represented by quasi-linear utility functions
For the special case in which all types of all agents can be represented by quasi-linear utility functions we
get as corollaries the following mechanism and theorem. In particular, if the agents are reporting their quasi-
linear utility functions, we get the classic incentive-compatibility characterization for quasi-linear utilities of
Vickrey, Clarke, Groves, Green-Laffont, and Roberts [15, 2, 5, 13, 4].
Mechanism 2. Given a vector of reports (t1, . . . , tn) for ti ∈ Ti,
◮ Define ui to be an arbitrary quasi-linear utility function which represents ti.
◮ Choose a⋆ ∈ argmaxa∈A′
(
ca +
∑
i∈N wi · ui (a, 0)
)
and return
• The chosen alternative: x (t1, . . . , tn) = a⋆.
• The payment of Agent i: If wi > 0,
pi (t1, . . . , tn) = hi (t−i)− 1/wi ·
ca⋆ +∑
j 6=i
wj · uj (a
⋆, 0)
 ,
for some function hi which depends only on the reports of the other agents, and in case wi = 0,
pi (t1, . . . , tn) = hi (t−i).
Theorem 3. If all types of all agents are represented by a quasi-linear utility functions, then
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(a) Let ∅ 6= A′ ⊆ A, w ∈ ∆ (N ) be an agent weight vector, c ∈ ℜA an alternative cost vector, and 〈x, p〉
Mechanism 2 defined by (A′, w, c). Then 〈x, p〉 is an incentive-compatible mechanism.
(b) If there are at least three alternatives (|A| > 3) and for all agents i ∈ N , any quasi-linear utility function
u ∈ UQL represents some type t ∈ Ti, then any incentive-compatible onto mechanism 〈x, p〉 can be defined
as Mechanism 2 w.r.t. A′ = A, an agent weight vector w ∈ ∆ (N ), and an alternative cost vector c ∈ ℜA.
Characterizations
For completeness, we also show two characterizations, one in utility terms and one in preference terms, of
the types which are represented by a quasi-linear function and of the types which are pos-represented by a
quasi-linear function.
Theorem 4.
Let u be a utility function which is strongly downward monotone in money. Then,
– u is represented by a quasi-linear utility function iff there exist a function v : A → ℜ and a strongly
monotone function ϕ : ℜ → ℜ s.t. u (a, z) = ϕ (v (a)− z).
– u is pos-represented by a quasi-linear utility function iff there exist a function v : A → ℜ and a strongly
monotone function ϕ : ℜ → ℜ s.t. u (a, z) = ϕ (v (a)− z) whenever z 6 v (a).
Theorem 5.
Let < be a strongly downward monotone in money preference. Then,
– < is represented by a quasi-linear utility function iff there exist an alternative a⋆ ∈ A and a payment
z⋆ ∈ ℜ s.t.
1. The preference < is continuous [8, Def. 3.C.1] in money.
2. For any x ∈ A there exist zx, ẑx ∈ ℜ s.t. 〈x, zx〉 ≺ 〈a⋆, z⋆〉 ≺ 〈x, ẑx〉.
3. For any two alternatives x, y ∈ A and payments zx, zy ∈ ℜ s.t 〈x, zx〉 < 〈y, zy〉 it holds that
∀α ∈ ℜ 〈x, zx − α〉 < 〈y, zy − α〉 .
– < is pos-represented by a quasi-linear utility function iff there exist an alternative a⋆ ∈ A and a payment
z⋆ ∈ ℜ s.t.
1. For any x ∈ A there exist zx, ẑx ∈ ℜ s.t. 〈x, zx〉 ≺ 〈a⋆, z⋆〉 ≺ 〈x, ẑx〉.
2. For any two alternatives x, y ∈ A and payments zx, zy ∈ ℜ s.t
{
〈x, zx〉 < 〈y, zy〉
〈x, zx〉 < 〈a⋆, z⋆〉
∀α ∈ ℜ+ 〈x, zx − α〉 < 〈y, zy − α〉 .
4 Discussion
Identifying the preference of an agent with her cardinal utility is basic in the theory of modeling economic
agents, and in most scenarios, unless additional strong assumptions are added, the utility is only a represen-
tation of the preference and does not hold any additional information of the decision behavior of the agent.
This rather simple insight allows one to extend incentive-compatibility results (or similar results regarding
decisions of individuals) beyond a-priori restrictive domains of utility functions. Moreover, in many cases,
one’s assumptions on the agents’ preferences are mostly irrelevant when considering outcomes below some
threshold or an outside option, which might allow us to extend such results even further.
In this work, we formalized this insight by defining a new representation notion, pos-representation, and
showed that the characterization of VCG mechanisms extends naturally and easily to type sets which are
pos-represented by quasi-linear utility functions. The proof technique of a simple reduction to the works of
Roberts [13] and Green-Laffont [4] also hints that one could see our characterization as a fuller version of the
VCG characterization. We expect that also the characterization of Holmstrom [6] can extended in a similar
fashion to characterization of type domains. Holmstrom [6] shows that one can replace the assumption of
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unrestrictiveness of the valuation domains by a weaker assumption that the domains are smoothly-connected.
We also suspect that finding the counterpart of smooth-connectiveness in preferences terms would be inter-
esting by its own.
We expect this insight to be applicable in many more scenarios in which results deal with quasi-linear
utilities while essentially not assuming the cardinal utility is an exact unique representation of the agents’
preferences, and moreover when assuming it represents the preferences only for a well-defined subdomain of
the outcomes.
4.1 The quasi-linear model (The transferable utility assumption)
As we argued in Section 1, our result shows that the main driving-force of the VCG characterization is
not the the ability to compare the intensity of preferences of the different agents and in particular we did
not assume a transferable utility model. Our mechanism is given the ordinal preferences of the agents and
outputs payments but in no place in the characterization we assumed that ‘money’ is the same commodity
for all agents and one could think of scenarios is which the designer would fine different agents using different
commodities (a trivial example would be fining using different currencies). The main message we see in our
work is that the main driving-force of the VCG characterization is the separability of the agents’ preferences
and the ability of the designer to fine the agents on a continuous scale, by that leaving the transferable utility
domain of quasi-linear utilities and returning to the non-transferable utility domain of Gibbard-Satterthwaite.
On the other hand, it is important to note that in our general model, (a) Exactly because lacking
the transferable utility assumption, budget-balancedness becomes more complex to define and it no longer
implies Pareto-optimality of the mechanism; (b) A randomized mechanism is not necessarily equivalent to a
deterministic one (See also below).
5 Other ordinal generalization
Common to the pos-representation notion we presented here and the Parallel utilities notion of Ma et al. [7]
is that both can be defined as representation by a quasi-linear utility function over a subset of the domain: In
the pos-representation case, whenever the utility is above a threshold; And in the Parallel utilities domain,
whenever the utility and the payment are positive. In a subsequent work, we follow this common trait and
show that our work extends easily to deal with quadrant domains in which both the utility and the payment
are bounded from below by some threshold.
Moreover, we can generalize the pos-representation assumption of the preferences to assume that a type
is pos-represented by a utility function of the form ui (a, z) = ui (a, 0)−φi (z) for some continuous monotone
bijection φi : ℜ → ℜ (i.e., an individual utility of money), and our characterization easily extends to this
case as well under an additional assumption that the designer knows the functions φi for all agents.
4
Last, we note that some of our initial assumptions on the mechanisms can be easily relaxed.
5.1 Non-direct revelation mechanisms
One could consider more general mechanisms in which the agents, instead of reporting utility functions
or valuation vectors, use more abstract actions in a sequential manner or a one-round one, and instead
of incentive-compatibility require implementation using dominant strategies. Applying a simple direct rev-
elation principle [11] shows that any such general dominant strategy implementation is equivalent to a
direct revelation incentive-compatible mechanism. The two mechanisms implement the same mapping of
the agents’ private preferences to a chosen alternative and a payment. Hence, more general mechanisms
cannot implement different allocation rules than those implemented by direct-revelation mechanisms. Still,
one might prefer using non-direct mechanisms for other reasons, like a more natural input language or lower
complexity of the mechanism.
4 This knowledge assumption might seems very strong, but note that this is the common assumption in the quasi-
linear model.
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5.2 Non-Deterministic mechanisms
The characterization problem of random incentive compatible mechanisms remains open. We did not model
the preferences of the agents over lotteries of outcomes, and in particular did not assume they have von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries [8, Def. 6.B.5]. Hence we can not derive results regarding
truthful mechanisms except the following easy claim.
Corollary 3. Given the conditions of Theorem 2, the only universally truthful mechanisms [12, Def. 9.38]
(i.e., truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all coin flips by the mechanism) are lotteries over mechanisms
of the type of Mechanism 1.
Extending our work to random mechanisms, even when assuming von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences,
should include also extending the notion of pos-representation. But we conjecture that in many cases such
extensions, especially of pos-representation using quasi-linear utility functions, will lose a lot of the bite of
the pos-representation notion.
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A Proof of Claim 1
Claim. Let u,w : A×ℜ → ℜ be two quasi-linear utility functions. Then the following three statements are
equivalent:
1. Both u and w represent the same preference over A×ℜ.
2. There exists a constant C ∈ ℜ s.t. for any alternative a ∈ A u (a, 0) = w (a, 0) + C.
3. There exists a constant C ∈ ℜ s.t. for any alternative a ∈ A and z ∈ ℜ u (a, z) = w (a, z) + C.
Proof.
(1)⇒ (2): If both u and w represent the same preference, then
∀a, b ∈ A, za, zb ∈ ℜ u (a, za) > u (b, zb) ⇐⇒ w (a, za) > w (b, zb) .
Both u and w are quasi-linear so we get that
∀a, b ∈ A, za, zb ∈ ℜ u (a, 0)− u (b, 0) > (za − zb) ⇐⇒ w (a, 0)− w (b, 0) > (za − zb) ,
and hence
∀a, b ∈ A u (a, 0)− u (b, 0) = w (a, 0)− w (b, 0)
and there exists a constant C ∈ ℜ s.t.
∀a ∈ A u (a, 0) = w (a, 0) + C.
(2)⇒ (3): Since u (a, z) = u (a, 0)− z and w (a, z) = w (a, 0)− z, this is a trivial derivation.
(3)⇒ (1): If there exists a constant C ∈ ℜ s.t.
∀a ∈ A, z ∈ ℜ u (a, z) = w (a, z) + C,
then
∀a, b ∈ A, za, zb ∈ ℜ u (a, za) > u (b, zb) ⇐⇒ w (a, za) > w (b, zb) . ⊓⊔
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B Proof of Claim 2
Claim. Let u,w : A×ℜ → ℜ be two quasi-linear utility functions.
1. If both u and w pos-represent the same preference, then there exists a constant C ∈ ℜ s.t.
∀a ∈ A, z ∈ ℜ w (a, z) = u (a, z) + C.
2. If there exists a positive constant C > 0 s.t.
∀a ∈ A, z ∈ ℜ w (a, z) = u (a, z)− C,
then w pos-represents any preference which is pos-represented by u.
Proof.
1. If both u and v pos-represent the same preference, then for any two alternatives a, b ∈ A and za, zb ∈ ℜ
s.t. za 6 min (u (a, 0) , w (a, 0)) we get that u (a, za) > 0 and w (a, za) > 0 so
u (a, za) > u (b, zb) ⇐⇒ w (a, za) > w (b, zb) .
Both u and w are quasi-linear so we get that
u (a, 0)− u (b, 0) > (za − zb) ⇐⇒ w (a, 0)− w (b, 0) > (za − zb) ,
and hence
∀a, b ∈ A u (a, 0)− u (b, 0) = w (a, 0)− w (b, 0)
and there exists a constant C ∈ ℜ s.t.
∀a ∈ A u (a, 0) = w (a, 0) + C, and
∀a ∈ A, z ∈ ℜ u (a, z) = w (a, z) + C.
2. Let < be a preference which is pos-represented by u. Let a, b ∈ A be two alternatives and za, zb ∈ ℜ two
payments s.t. either w (a, za) > 0 or w (b, zb) > 0. Then, either u (a, za) > w (a, za) > 0 or u (b, zb) >
w (b, zb) > 0, and
w (a, za) > w (b, zb) ⇐⇒ u (a, za) > u (b, zb) ⇐⇒ 〈a, za〉 < 〈b, zb〉 . ⊓⊔
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C Proof of Corollary 2
Corollary.
If there are at least three alternatives and the type sets {Ti}i∈N satisfy the conditions of Thm. 2, then
for any incentive-compatible onto mechanism 〈x, p〉 without transfers (i.e., pi (t1, . . . , tn) ≡ 0 for all i ∈ N ),
there exists a unique agent d ∈ N (a dictator) s.t. for any type profile (t1, . . . , tn)
x (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ argmax
a∈A
ud (a, 0) .
Proof.
By Thm. 2, there exists an agent weight vector w ∈ ∆ (N ) and an alternative cost vector c ∈ ℜA s.t. for
any report vector,
x (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ argmax
a∈A
(
ca +
∑
i∈N
wi · ui (a, 0)
)
.
Let d ∈ N be an agent s.t. wd > 0 and notice that if Agent d knows the actions of the others she can enforce
any outcome in A. Since there are no monetary transfers and the mechanism is incentive compatible we get
that for any type profile (t1, . . . , tn)
x (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ argmax
a∈A
ud (a, 0) .
Since this property cannot hold for two different agents the dictator must be unique. ⊓⊔
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D Proof of Theorem 4
Claim 3. Let u be a utility function which is strongly downward monotone in money. Then, u is represented
by a quasi-linear utility function iff there exist a function v : A → ℜ and a strongly monotone function
ϕ : ℜ → ℜ s.t.
u (a, z) = ϕ (v (a)− z) .
Proof.
⇐: Trivial since ϕ (v (a)− z) and (v (a)− z) represent the same preference.
⇒: By definition, there exists a function v : A → ℜ s.t. for any x, y ∈ A and zx, zy ∈ ℜ
u (x, zx) > u (y, zy) ⇐⇒ v (x)− zx > v (y)− zy,
and in particular
u (x, zx) = u (y, zy) ⇐⇒ v (x)− zx = v (y)− zy,
and u (x, zx) = u (y, zx + v (y)− v (x)) .
Let a⋆ be an arbitrary alternative and define a mapping ϕ : ℜ → ℜ by ϕ (α) = u (a⋆, v (a⋆)− α). Then,
ϕ is monotone: If α < β then v (a⋆)− α > v (a⋆)− β and hence
ϕ (α) = u (a⋆, v (a⋆)− α) < u (a⋆, v (a⋆)− β) = ϕ (β) .
u (a, z) = ϕ (v (a)− z): For any a ∈ A and z ∈ ℜ: u (a, z) = u (a⋆, z + v (a⋆)− v (a))
= ϕ (v (a)− z) . ⊓⊔
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Claim 4. Let u be a utility function which is strongly downward monotone in money. Then u is pos-
represented by a quasi-linear utility function iff there exist a function v : A → ℜ and a strongly monotone
function ϕ : ℜ → ℜ s.t.
u (a, z) = ϕ (v (a)− z) whenever z 6 v (a) .
Proof.
⇐: Trivial since ϕ (v (a)− z) and (v (a)− z) represent the same preference and hence pos-represented by the
same utility functions.
⇒: By definition, there exists a function v : A → ℜ s.t. for any two alternatives x, y ∈ A and payments
zx, zy ∈ ℜ, if v (x) > zx,
u (x, zx) > u (y, zy) ⇐⇒ v (x)− zx > v (y)− zy,
and in particular
u (x, zx) = u (y, zy) ⇐⇒ v (x)− zx = v (y)− zy,
and u (x, zx) = u (y, zx + v (y)− v (x)) .
Let a⋆ be an arbitrary alternative and define a mapping ϕ : ℜ → ℜ by
ϕ (α) =
{
α > 0 u (a⋆, v (a⋆)− α)
α 6 0 u (a⋆, v (a⋆)) + α.
Then, ϕ is monotone: – If α < β 6 0 then ϕ (β)− ϕ (α) = β − α > 0.
– If 0 6 α < β then ϕ (β)−ϕ (α) = u (a⋆, v (a⋆)− β)−u (a⋆, v (a⋆)− α) > 0.
– If α 6 0 < β then ϕ (α) = u (a⋆, v (a⋆)) + α 6 u (a⋆, v (a⋆)) <
u (a⋆, v (a⋆)− β) = ϕ (β).
u (a, z) = ϕ (v (a)− z) whenever z 6 v (a): For any a ∈ A and z 6 v (a):
u (a, z) = u (a⋆, z + v (a⋆)− v (a))
= ϕ (v (a)− z) . ⊓⊔
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E Proof of Theorem 5
Claim 5. A preference < is represented by a quasi-linear utility function iff there exist an alternative a⋆ ∈ A
and a payment z⋆ ∈ ℜ s.t.
1. The preference < is continuous in money.
2. For any x ∈ A there exists zx ∈ ℜ s.t. 〈x, zx〉 ≻ 〈a⋆, z⋆〉.
For any x ∈ A there exists zx ∈ ℜ s.t. 〈x, zx〉 ≺ 〈a⋆, z⋆〉.
3. For any two alternatives x, y ∈ A and payments zx, zy ∈ ℜ s.t 〈x, zx〉 < 〈y, zy〉 it holds that
∀α ∈ ℜ 〈x, zx − α〉 < 〈y, zy − α〉 .
Proof.
⇒: Trivial by the properties of quasi-linear functions.
⇐: First, we show that given any alternative a ∈ A,< is weakly monotone in money. Assume for contradiction
that there exist z1 < z2 < z3 s.t.
{
〈a, z1〉 ≺ 〈a, z2〉
〈a, z2〉 ≻ 〈a, z3〉
and 〈a, z3〉 4 〈a, z1〉 (the cases
{
〈a, z1〉 ≻ 〈a, z2〉
〈a, z2〉 ≺ 〈a, z3〉
and
〈a, z1〉 ≺ 〈a, z2〉
〈a, z2〉 ≻ 〈a, z3〉
〈a, z3〉 ≻ 〈a, z1〉
are symmetric). By (1) there exists z′3 ∈ (z1, z3] s.t. 〈a, z1〉 ∼ 〈a, z
′
3〉. W.l.o.g., z
′
3 = z3. By
(3), for any 0 6 k 6 n
〈a, z1〉 ∼ 〈a, z1 + k/n (z3 − z1)〉 ∼ 〈a, z1〉 .
On the other hand, by (1) there exists a ε > 0 s.t.
∀z′2 s.t. |z2 − z
′
2| < ε 〈a, z
′
2〉 ≻ 〈a, z1〉 ,
so we get a contradiction.
Moreover, we show that < is strongly monotone in money. Assume for contradiction that there exist
z1 < z2 s.t. 〈a, z1〉 ∼ 〈a, z2〉. Then, by weak monotonicity, for any z ∈ [z1, z2]
〈a, z1〉 ∼ 〈a, z〉 ∼ 〈a, z2〉 ,
and by (3) 〈a, z1〉 ∼ 〈a, z〉 for any z ∈ ℜ, in contradiction to (2).
Note that it cannot be that < is upward monotone in money for some x ∈ A and downward monotone
for a different y ∈ A. Otherwise, by (2), there exist zx, zy ∈ ℜ s.t. 〈x, zx〉 ≻ 〈a⋆, z⋆〉 ≻ 〈y, zy〉, and by the
monotonicity and (2), there exists δ > 0 large enough s.t.
〈x, zx − δ〉 ≺ 〈a
⋆, z⋆〉 and 〈y, zy − δ〉 ≻ 〈a
⋆, z⋆〉 ,
in contradiction to (3).
W.l.o.g, assume that < is strongly downward monotone in money (Otherwise, we’ll show it is represented
by a utility function quasi-linear in (−z)). Next, we define v : A → ℜ by
v (x) = max {z | 〈x, z〉 < 〈a⋆, z⋆〉} ,
and note that – By (1) the set {z | 〈x, z〉 < 〈a⋆, z⋆〉} is closed.
– By (2) the set {z | 〈x, z〉 < 〈a⋆, z⋆〉} is not empty and bounded from above.
Hence, the maximum exists. Moreover, because of (1), it holds that 〈x, v (x)〉 ∼ 〈a⋆, z⋆〉 and
∀x, y ∈ A 〈x, v (x)〉 ∼ 〈y, v (y)〉 .
Now, for any x, y ∈ A and zx, zy ∈ ℜ
〈x, zx〉 < 〈y, zy〉 ⇐⇒ (3) 〈x, v (x)〉 < 〈y, zy + v (x)− zx〉
⇐⇒ 〈y, v (y)〉 < 〈y, zy + v (x)− zx〉
⇐⇒ (MON)v (y) 6 zy + v (x)− zx
⇐⇒ v (x)− zx > v (y)− zy. ⊓⊔
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Claim 6. A strongly downward monotone in money preference < is pos-represented by a quasi-linear utility
function iff there exist an alternative a⋆ ∈ A and a payment z⋆ ∈ ℜ s.t.
1. For any x ∈ A there exists a payment zx ∈ ℜ s.t. 〈x, zx〉 ≻ 〈a⋆, z⋆〉.
For any x ∈ A there exists a payment zx ∈ ℜ s.t. 〈x, zx〉 ≺ 〈a⋆, z⋆〉.
2. For any two alternatives x, y ∈ A and payments zx, zy ∈ ℜ s.t
{
〈x, zx〉 < 〈y, zy〉
〈x, zx〉 < 〈a⋆, z⋆〉
∀α ∈ ℜ+ 〈x, zx − α〉 < 〈y, zy − α〉 .
Proof.
⇒: Trivial by the properties of quasi-linear functions and choosing a⋆ and z⋆ s.t. the quasi-linear function
satisfies u (a⋆, z⋆) = 0.
⇐: First, we note that since < is strongly monotone, it is continuous in money.5 Let a ∈ A and {zt} , {wt}
be two sequences of monetary transfers s.t. ∀t 〈a, zt〉 4 〈a, wt〉, limt→∞ zt = z, and limt→∞ wt = p. Then,
∀t wt 6 zt and hence w 6 z and 〈a, w〉 < 〈a, z〉.
Next, we define v : A → ℜ by
v (x) = max {z | 〈x, z〉 < 〈a⋆, z⋆〉} ,
and note that – By continuity the set {z | 〈x, z〉 < 〈a⋆, z⋆〉} is closed.
– By (1) the set {z | 〈x, z〉 < 〈a⋆, z⋆〉} is not empty and bounded from above.
Hence, the maximum exists. Moreover, because of the continuity, it holds that 〈x, v (x)〉 ∼ 〈a⋆, z⋆〉 and
∀x, y ∈ A 〈x, v (x)〉 ∼ 〈y, v (y)〉 .
Now, for any x, y ∈ A and zx, zy ∈ ℜ s.t. v (x)− zx > 0
〈x, zx〉 < 〈y, zy〉 ⇐⇒ (2) 〈x, v (x)〉 < 〈y, zy + v (x)− zx〉
⇐⇒ 〈y, v (y)〉 < 〈y, zy + v (x)− zx〉
⇐⇒ (MON)v (y) 6 zy + v (x)− zx
⇐⇒ v (x)− zx > v (y)− zy. ⊓⊔
5 We note that this claim does not hold for weakly downward monotone preferences. For example, the preference
which is defined by u (a, z) =
{
z 6 0 1
z > 0 0
is weakly downward monotone in money but is not continuous. The
preference is not continuous since ∀n 〈a, 1/n〉 4 〈a, 1/2〉 but 〈a, 0〉 ≻ 〈a, 1/2〉.
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